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OPINION 
 
 
STEARNS, District Judge. 
 
This appeal arises from a dispute over the right of 
fishermen to access the Atlantic Sea Scallop Fishery.  At 
issue is an order of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey denying summary judgment on all 
claims by Appellants,  who are former general category 
scallop permit holders, while granting summary judgment 
on all claims to Appellees Gary Locke, in his capacity as 
Secretary of the United States Department of Commerce, 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
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(NOAA), and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).  
We are asked to resolve: (1) whether NMFS complied with 
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. '' 701-
706, and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976 (Magnuson-Stevens Act), 16 
U.S.C. '' 1801-1883, when it promulgated regulations 
implementing Amendment 11 to the Atlantic Sea Scallop 
Fishery Management Plan, including a Acontrol date@ that 
effectively terminated the access rights of general scallop 
fishermen who were not established in the fishery prior to 
November 1, 2004; (2) whether the process by which 
Amendment 11 was adopted complied with the Magnuson-
Stevens Act requirement that public hearings be held in 
Aappropriate locations in the geographical area@ that will be 
affected by changes to a Fishery Management Plan (FMP);  
(3) whether NMFS reasonably concluded that Amendment 
11=s reliance on NMFS internal dataset to determine permit 
eligibility complied with the Magnuson-Stevens Act=s 
National Standard 2, which requires the use of the Abest 
scientific information available@; and (4) whether NMFS 
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reasonably concluded that Amendment 11=s limitations on 
the general category scallop fishery were consistent with the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act=s National Standard 5, which 
prohibits the implementation of any fishery management 
measure that has Aeconomic allocation as its sole purpose.@  
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
2
    
I. 
The Magnuson-Stevens Act 
                                                 
2
 Before the District Court, the fishermen raised 
several additional contentions: (1) that the loss of the use of 
the Aunique fishing gear@ that they had purchased for the 
scallop harvest constituted an unconstitutional taking; (2) 
that Amendment 11 violated National Standard 3 by placing 
the Northern Gulf of Maine (NGOM) fishery under a 
separate management scheme; and (3) that Amendment 11 
violated National Standard 4 by allocating a higher catch 
limit to NGOM permit holders than to incidental catch 
permit holders.  Judge Cooper ably addressed these issues in 
her opinion, and they are not being pressed by the scallop 
fishermen on appeal.  See Gen. Category Scallop Fishermen 
v. Sec=y of U.S. Dep=t of Commerce, 720 F. Supp. 2d 564 
(D.N.J. 2010). 
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The Magnuson-Stevens Act, as amended by Congress 
in 1990 and 1996, delegates to NMFS, by and through the 
Secretary of Commerce, the authority to implement a 
comprehensive national fisheries management program in 
order Ato prevent overfishing, to rebuild overfished stocks, 
to insure conservation, to facilitate long-term protection of 
essential fish habitats, and to realize the full potential of the 
Nation=s fishery resources.@  See 16 U.S.C. ' 1801(a)(6).3  
The Secretary=s authority is exercised through eight 
Regional Fishery Management Councils composed of state 
fishery managers, the regional NMFS fisheries 
administrator, and representatives of the fishing, 
environmental, and academic communities.  The Councils 
are responsible for preparing FMPs and recommending 
implementing regulations for the Exclusive Economic Zone 
that stretches 200 nautical miles seaward from the coastal 
                                                 
3
 Under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, a Afishery@ is 
either Aone or more stocks of fish that can be treated as a 
unit for purposes of conservation and management that are 
identified on the basis of geographic, scientific, technical, 
recreational, or economic characteristics, or method of 
catch,@ or Aany fishing for such stocks.@  50 C.F.R. ' 600.10.  
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boundaries of the States within each region.
4
  The task of 
approving an FMP falls to the Secretary of Commerce, who 
is mandated to review the FMP to ensure that it complies 
with the ten ANational Standards@ established by the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act.
5
  See 16 U.S.C. ' 1851(a)(1) - (10). 
 The Secretary must also publish the proposed FMP and 
accept public comment for a 60-day period before giving his 
or her final approval.  16 U.S.C. ' 1854(a)(1)(B).  An 
implementing regulation goes through the same process of 
review, although the Secretary may limit the period for 
public comment to a minimum of 15 days.  16 U.S.C. ' 
1854(b)(1)(A).  NMFS is the executive agency responsible 
for overseeing the enforcement of an approved FMP and 
any of its attendant regulations. 
                                                 
4
 The Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States 
extends the full 200 nautical miles permitted under 
international law and treaty.  16 U.S.C. ' 1802(11); see Am. 
Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  A national state has sovereign rights 
over natural resources, living and nonliving, within its 
Exclusive Economic Zone. 
5
 The Secretary has delegated his authority under the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act to promulgate regulations 
implementing FMPs and their Amendments to NMFS. 
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The New England Fishery Management Council 
and the Scallop Fishery 
The development of the Atlantic Sea Scallop FMP is 
the responsibility of the  New England Fishery Management 
Council (NEFMC).  All parties agree that the NEFMC is 
not an Aagency@ within the meaning of the APA.  In 1994, 
the Alimited access@ scallop FMP then in place was amended 
(Amendment 4) to provide for an Aopen access@ fishery to 
Aallow a flexible program for seasonal or opportunistic 
fisheries targeting inshore scallops.@  Both Alimited access@ 
and Aopen access general category@ scalloping permits 
authorized the harvest of up to 400 pounds of Atlantic sea 
scallops daily.  Only large-scale scallop boats, however, 
were eligible for the Alimited access@ permits.  Small-scale 
scallop fishing vessels and vessels that harvested scallops as 
an incidental bycatch were issued Ageneral category@ 
permits.  The Appellants are small-scale general category 
scallop fishermen.  
After the passage of Amendment 4, the number of 
general category permit holders exploded, fueling concerns 
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about overfishing.
6
  These concerns prompted the  NEFMC 
to consider regulatory responses to limit the number of 
participants in the general category scallop fishery.  On 
August 31, 2004, the NEFMC published a ANotice of a 
Public Meeting@ in the Federal Register announcing a three-
day meeting to be held from September 14-16, 2004, in 
Fairhaven, Massachusetts, Ato consider actions affecting 
New England fisheries in the exclusive economic zone.@  
According to the meeting agenda, among the issues that 
A[might] be discussed@ were Aactions to address overfishing@ 
and Aactions to cap or reduce general category scallop 
landings and/or improve reporting measures.@ 
                                                 
6
 From 1994 to 2005, the number of general category 
permits increased from 1,992 to 2,950, and the number of 
general category vessels landing scallops more than tripled. 
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During the meeting, NEFMC Vice-Chairman Thomas 
Hill announced his intention Ato propose a motion to 
establish a control date effective [upon] publication of the 
Federal Register . . . that would freeze the number of 
permits in the fishery.@7  One of the participants (Maggie 
Raymond of the Associated Fisheries of Maine) objected 
that the subject of a control date Awas not posted on the 
agenda [and so] this would be the only opportunity for the 
public to speak to that.@  Hill replied that the NEFMC 
Anever notifie[s] the public in advance,@ because it Adefeats 
the purpose of the control date if you notify in advance.@  
Hill=s motion to publish notice of a control date for the 
general category permit scallop fishery was adopted by a 
13-1 vote, with two abstentions.   
NMFS published the notice in the Federal Register on 
November 1, 2004.  In relevant part, the Advance Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) sought public comment on: 
                                                 
7
 A control date Aprovides notice to anyone 
subsequently entering a fishery that he is not assured of 
continued participation in the fishery should a limited entry 
scheme be implemented.@  Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., 379 
10 
 
                                                                                                             
F.3d at 1366 n.3.  
11 
 
proposed rulemaking to control future access 
to the open access vessel permit category 
(general category) Atlantic sea scallop fishery 
if a management regime is developed and 
implemented under [the Magnuson-Stevens 
Act] to limit the number of participants in this 
sector of the scallop fishery.  . . .  This 
announcement is intended, in part, to promote 
awareness of potential eligibility criteria for 
future access so as to discourage speculative 
entry into the fishery while the [NEFMC] 
considers whether and how access to the 
general category sea scallop fishery could be 
controlled.  The date of publication of this 
notice, November 1, 2004, shall be known as 
the Acontrol date@ and may be used for 
establishing eligibility criteria for determining 
levels of future access to the sea scallop 
fishery subject to Federal authority. 
 
69 Fed. Reg. 63341.   
Amendment 11 
In January of 2006, the NEFMC initiated a Ascoping@ 
process inviting the fishing public to participate in the 
crafting of Amendment 11 to the Atlantic Sea Scallop 
FMP.
8
  As announced, the purpose of Amendment 11 was 
to establish Acriteria and authority for determining the 
                                                 
8
 AScoping@ is a term of administrative art that 
describes the process used by federal agencies to identify 
public concerns over the management of land and natural 
resources.  
12 
 
percentage of scallop catch allocated to the general category 
fleet@ and to implement an Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) 
permit system.  Between February of 2006 and June of 
2007, the NEFMC held 35 public meetings in seven states 
to discuss the adoption of Amendment 11.  On April 11, 
2007, the NEFMC submitted a Draft Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement to NMFS, the final version 
of which was submitted to NMFS on September 24, 2007.  
The NEFMC formally adopted  Amendment 11 on June 20, 
2007.  On December 17, 2007, NMFS published 
Amendment 11 in the Federal Register with its proposed 
implementing regulations and invited public comment 
through January 31, 2008.  On February 27, 2008, NMFS 
adopted Amendment 11 on behalf of the Secretary of 
Commerce.  The final rule was published on April 14, 2008, 
and took effect on July 1, 2008. 
Amendment 11 significantly reduced the number of 
vessels eligible to participate in the scallop harvest by 
replacing the open access general category fishery with a 
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Alimited access general category@ (LAGC).  Amendment 11 
provides for three classes of LAGC scalloping permits: (1) 
an IFQ permit; (2) a Northern Gulf of Maine permit; and (3) 
an incidental catch permit.  At issue in this appeal is the IFQ 
permit, which allows a permittee to land up to 400 pounds 
of shucked scallop meat per trip.
9
 
                                                 
9
 A Atrip@ is defined as Athe time period that begins 
when a fishing vessel departs from a dock . . . and that 
terminates with a return to a dock . . . .@  50 C.F.R. ' 600.10. 
14 
 
To be eligible for an IFQ permit, NMFS records must 
confirm that the applicant vessel landed at least 1,000 
pounds of scallop meat in any fishing year between March 
1, 2001, and November 1, 2004.  The vessel must also have 
been issued a general category scallop permit during the 
fishing year in which the qualifying landing was made.  The 
individual quota is determined by a formula that weights the 
vessel=s best year of scalloping and the number of years it 
has been actively engaged in scallop fishing.  These 
numbers are derived from NMFS landings data compiled 
from dealer reports.  A vessel owner may appeal the denial 
of a permit to NMFS, but only on the ground that the data 
NMFS relied on to determine eligibility was incorrect.
10
  
                                                 
10
 Once issued, an IFQ permit may be transferred 
from one scallop vessel to another with the approval of the 
NMFS Regional Administrator.  No single vessel issued an 
IFQ permit may be allocated more than two percent of the 
total allowable IFQ catch, nor may any individual have an 
ownership interest in more than five percent of the catch 
allocated to the scallop fleet. 
15 
 
Amendment 11 also allocates the scallop harvest 
between the limited access fleet and the LAGC permit 
holders.
11
  The estimated landings of scallops by boats with 
incidental catch permits are first subtracted from the 
projected annual scallop harvest.  IFQ permit holders are 
then allocated five percent of the remaining catch, while 
almost all of the rest is apportioned to the limited access 
scallop fishery.
12
  Most of the Appellant fishermen received 
their first general scallop permit after the control date of 
November 1, 2004; thus, they are not eligible to receive 
LAGC scallop permits.  For all practical purposes, their 
scallop fishing days are over. 
II. 
Standard of Review 
                                                 
11
 The NGOM Scallop Management Area is not 
included in the total allowable catch as it is only an 
occasional scallop fishery with Aunique characteristics.@  
Appellants have dropped their challenge to the exclusion of 
the NGOM from the calculation of the total allowable catch. 
12
 Half of one percent of the catch is given over to 
limited access vessels that also hold IFQ permits.  
16 
 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the District 
Court=s order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1291.  We review the 
District Court=s grant of summary judgment de novo and 
apply a deferential standard in reviewing actions taken by 
NMFS on behalf of the Secretary, particularly those that fall 
within NMFS=s special expertise.13  See Marsh v. Oregon 
Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377-378 (1989); 
Cyberworld Enter. Techs., Inc. v. Napolitano, 602 F.3d 189, 
195-196 (3d Cir. 2010).  We may set aside the Secretary=s 
action only if it is Aarbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,@ or 
taken Awithout observance of procedure required by law.@  5 
U.S.C. '' 706(2)(A)-(D).   
                                                 
13
 The Magnuson-Stevens Act specifically directs 
courts to look to the APA when reviewing an FMP 
implementation action taken by the Secretary.  See 16 
U.S.C. '' 1855(f)(1) and (2).  An implementing regulation 
of an FMP may only be set aside  on the grounds specified 
in 5 U.S.C. '' 706(2)(A)-(D). 
Although this Court may not substitute its judgment 
for that of the Secretary, we may Aconsider whether the 
[Secretary=s] decision was based on a consideration of the 
17 
 
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of 
judgment.@  Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).   The scope of review, 
however, is narrow B we must presume the validity of the 
Secretary=s decision.  Id. at 415.  AThe Secretary=s 
assessment of which fishery conservation and management 
measures would be in the nation=s best interest is >a classic 
example of a factual dispute the resolution of which 
implicates substantial agency expertise.=@  Ace Lobster Co., 
Inc. v. Evans, 165 F. Supp. 2d 148, 165 (D.R.I. 2001) 
(quoting Nat=l Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. Mosbacher, 732 F. 
Supp. 210, 223 (D.D.C. 1990)). 
III. 
Issue 1: The November 1, 2004 Control Date   
The principal argument made by the Appellant 
fishermen is that the District Court erred in determining that 
the NEFMC=s Acontrol date@ recommendation was not 
subject to the rulemaking provisions of the APA.
14
  They 
                                                 
14
 The scallop fishermen contend that the passage of a 
control date constitutes a rule under the APA because it is a 
18 
 
reason that because NOAA and NMFS are agencies that 
must answer to the notice and comment requirements of the 
APA and the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the NEFMC by 
extension is governed by the same constraints.
15
  Operating 
from this premise, the fishermen find fault with almost 
every step taken by the NEFMC in developing the control 
date proposal.  First, they object to the fact that notice of the 
September 14-16, 2004 meeting was published in the 
Federal Register Aonly@ 14 days in advance.   Second, they 
claim that the published agenda failed to make specific 
mention of the possible adoption of a control date.  Third, 
the fishermen argue that Vice-Chairman Hill ambushed 
them by bringing the motion to establish a control date to a 
                                                                                                             
Awhole or a part of an agency statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to 
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.@  5 U.S.C. ' 
551(4). 
15
 The fishermen concede B  as they must B that the 
NEFMC is not itself an Aagency@ falling directly under the 
rulemaking requirements of the APA.  See J.H. Miles & 
Co., Inc. v. Brown, 910 F. Supp. 1138, 1159 (E.D. Va. 
1995) (determining that the Mid-Atlantic Fishery 
Management Council is not an Aagency@ within the meaning 
of the APA).   
19 
 
snap vote, depriving them of a meaningful opportunity to 
mobilize in opposition.
16
   
                                                 
16
 The scallop fishermen allege that the NEFMC 
acted in violation of the notice and comment provisions of 5 
U.S.C. '' 553(b)(1) and (3); 16 U.S.C. '' 1852(h)(3), 
1852(i)(2)(c); Exec. Order No. 12866, ' 6(a)(1), 50 C.F.R. 
' 600.135(a).   
The fishermen also object to the selection of 
November 1, 2004, as the control date.  They contend that 
the NEFMC Aarbitrarily and capriciously let the specific 
control date be determined by publication in the Federal 
Register . . . by some unknown individual@ rather than by 
the NEFMC members themselves.    They further argue that 
the publication of the control date in the Federal Register 
did not amount to Awide publicity in the major fishing ports 
of the region@ as 16 U.S.C. ' 1852(i)(2)(c) requires.   
Finally, the fishermen contend that the NEFMC foreclosed 
all meaningful opportunity for public comment by requiring 
that all written comments on the Aproposed rule@ be 
submitted by December 1, 2004, only one month after its 
publication in the Federal Register.   
The flaw in the fishermen=s argument is found in its 
20 
 
fundamental premise B that the publication by NMFS of the 
NEFMC=s proposed November 1, 2004 control date 
promulgated a rule.  In fact, the control date did not become 
a rule until NMFS adopted Amendment 11 on February 27, 
2008.  The November 1, 2004 ANPR=s title and content 
made clear that the control date was a proposed rule and 
nothing more. 
This notification established November 1, 
2004, as the control date for potential use in 
determining historical or traditional 
participation in the general category scallop 
fishery.  Consideration of a control date does 
not commit the Council or NMFS to develop 
any particular management system or criteria 
for participation in this fishery.  The Council 
may choose a different control date, or may 
choose a management program that does not 
make use of such a date. 
 
69 Fed. Reg. at 63342.  Indeed, if the November 1, 2004 
publication of the control date by NMFS were a rule, the 
fishermen=s action would be time-barred by the Magnuson-
Stevens Act=s statute of limitations, which requires that a 
petition for review of a final rule be filed within 30 days of 
21 
 
its publication.
17
  See 16 U.S.C. ' 1855 (f)(1). 
                                                 
17
 We are not without sympathy for the fishermen=s 
response to the double bind in which they find themselves: 
AAppellees want flexible rulemaking by passing substantive 
rules and setting them aside for years only later 
incorporating them into another rule.  In the alternative, they 
want that the control date is a rule, but then argue the 
Fishermen are time-barred.@  However, the relief they seek B 
the retroactive application of the rulemaking requirements 
of the APA to the actions of the NEFMC in developing 
Amendment 11 B is beyond the competence of this Court to 
grant.  See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (A[T]he [APA] 
established the maximum procedural requirements which 
Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon 
agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.  Agencies 
are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise 
of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not 
free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant 
them.@) (footnote omitted). 
We also agree with the District Court that NMFS 
reasonably concluded that the steps taken by the NEFMC in 
developing Amendment 11 complied with the procedural 
requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.  See 16 U.S.C. 
' 1854(a)(1).  The NEFMC gave timely public notice of the 
September 2004 meeting by publishing the date 14 days in 
advance as the Magnuson-Stevens Act required.  Id. ' 
1852(i)(2)(c).  The meeting was announced in the Federal 
Register and in various fishing publications distributed in 
22 
 
the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions, including two 
with combined circulations in the tens of thousands B 
Commercial Fisheries News and National Fisherman.  The 
notice of the meeting was also posted on the NMFS website. 
  The success of the notice effort is demonstrated by the fact 
that over 70 stakeholders attended the meeting.   
We are also of the view that the November 1, 2004 
publication of the proposed control date by NMFS came 
reasonably close on the heels of the NEFMC vote.  As 
Appellees note, this publication was followed by a series of 
notices and public hearings tracking the shaping of 
Amendment 11 over the next three years.  These hearings 
culminated in the November and December of 2007 
publication by NMFS of the final rule and the implementing 
regulations and yet another round of public comment.
18
   
                                                 
18
 According to Appellees, at least four of the 
Appellant fishermen submitted written comments 
expressing opposition to the November 1, 2004 control date.  
The fishermen object more substantively to the fact 
that the NEFMC meeting discussed a control date at all, 
contending that the discussion and vote deviated from ' 
23 
 
1852(i)(2)(c) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, which provides 
that A[t]he published agenda of the [regular] meeting may 
not be modified to include additional matters for Council 
action without public notice or within 14 days prior to the 
meeting date.@  Although the use of the specific term 
Acontrol date@ in the proposed agenda might have been 
preferable, the agenda referred to Aactions to address 
overfishing@ as well as Aactions to cap or reduce general 
category scallop landings.@  We think this sufficient to have 
put the fishermen on notice that a control date might well be 
one of the mechanisms put forward at the meeting for 
reducing access to the scallop fishery. 
Issue 2: Mandate to Hold Public Meetings in All 
Geographic Areas 
The fishermen next argue that the District Court erred 
in concluding that the NEFMC complied Aat least 
minimally@ with the mandate that public meetings to discuss 
new management measures like Amendment 11 be held in 
Aappropriate locations in the geographical area concerned.@  
The locations also include areas under the authority of 
24 
 
another Council if the measures could  Aaffect fishermen of 
that area.@  16 U.S.C. ' 1852(h)(3).  Following the 
publication of the November 1, 2004 ANPR, 35 public 
meetings were held over a span of 18 months in Maine, 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, 
New Jersey, and Virginia.  While it is true, as the fishermen 
complain, that most of the meetings were held in the New 
England region, that fact by itself is unsurprising, given that 
Georges Bank is the most sensitive of the environs of 
fishable Atlantic sea scallops.
19
  Three public meetings were 
held outside of the jurisdiction of the NEFMC.  Two of 
these were held in New Jersey.  The first meeting in 
February of 2006 in Cape May attracted 150 participants.  A 
second New Jersey meeting held in May of 2007 in 
Manahawkin drew another 30 fishermen.  Later that month, 
a third meeting in Newport News, Virginia, attracted some 
25 participants. 
                                                 
19
 See Dvora Hart, Status of Fishery Resources off the 
Northeastern U.S., NOAA (Dec. 2006), 
http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/sos/spsyn/iv/scallop/. 
We can find no authority that supports the 
25 
 
fishermen=s assertion that NMFS was required to hold at 
least one public meeting in every State comprising the New 
England and the Mid-Atlantic regions, including Delaware, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland and North Carolina.  The 
Magnuson-Stevens Act requires that public meetings Ashall@ 
occur Aat appropriate times and in appropriate locations in 
the geographical area concerned, so as to allow all interested 
persons an opportunity to be heard in the development of 
fishery management plans and amendments to such plans, . . 
. .@  16 U.S.C. ' 1852(h)(3).  Other than providing 
extraneous dictionary definitions explaining that Ashall@ is a 
word of affirmative command, the fishermen point to no 
statute or regulation that required the NEFMC to convene a 
meeting in every port of call on the Atlantic seaboard.  
More meetings might have been held, but that is not to say 
that the 35 that were held failed to satisfy ' 1852(h)(3). 
Issue 3: National Standard 2     
The fishermen next complain that the District Court 
erred in finding that NMFS=s decision to rely on dealer 
reports contained in its own database to calculate historical 
26 
 
scallop landings complied with National Standard 2.
20
  The 
fishermen contend that the NMFS database is Aflawed@ and 
that NMFS acted unreasonably in refusing to correct errors 
in the compiled dealer reports by cross-checking the NMFS 
data against the fishermen=s self-reported Vessel Trip 
Reports (VTR) and the dealers= own datasets.   
Under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, FMPs must 
Acontain the conservation and management measures . . . 
which are . . . consistent with the national standards, the 
other provisions of this chapter, . . . and any other applicable 
law.@  16 U.S.C. ' 1853(a)(1)( C).  National Standard 2 
stipulates that  A[c]onservation and management measures 
shall be based upon the best scientific information 
available.@  16 U.S.C. ' 1851(a)(2).  In deciding whether 
scientific information is the Abest available,@ substantial 
deference is accorded to the Secretary=s assessment of the 
                                                 
20
 As will be recalled, to be eligible for a LAGC 
permit, Amendment 11 requires an applicant to have landed 
at least 1,000 pounds of shucked scallop meat during at least 
one fishing year between March 1, 2000, and November 2, 
2004.  The fishermen do not challenge the eligibility 
criteria, but rather the data used to calculate a fisherman=s 
27 
 
quality of what is available.  See Washington Crab 
Producers, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 924 F.2d 1438, 1448-1449 
(9th Cir. 1990).  See also C & W Fish Co., Inc. v. Fox, 931 
F.2d 1556, 1652 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (a court=s task on review 
is simply Ato determine whether the Secretary=s conclusion 
that the standards have been satisfied is rational and 
supported by the record.@).    
                                                                                                             
yearly scallop catch.  
We discern no error in the District Court=s 
determination that the decision Ato utilize NMFS landings 
data from dealer reports to determine whether a vessel met 
the 1,000-pound landings criterion@ did not contravene 
National Standard 2.  AIt is well settled . . . that the Secretary 
can act when the available science is incomplete or 
imperfect, even where concerns have been raised about the 
accuracy of the methods or models employed.@  North 
Carolina Fisheries Ass=n, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 518 F. Supp. 2d 
62, 85 (D.D.C. 2007).  During the development of 
Amendment 11, NMFS and the NEFMC recognized that 
flaws existed in all of the available data groups, but 
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concluded that there were no practical or cost-effective 
means of correcting the Amany errors in both VTR and 
dealer datasets.@ 
To address errors or omissions in the NMFS data, the 
framers of Amendment 11 adopted a suggestion made by a 
public meeting participant that Aa full appeals process@ be 
provided through which fishermen who were denied LAGC 
permits could challenge the denial Aon the grounds that the 
information used by the Regional Administrator was 
incorrect.@  73 Fed. Reg. at 20092.  The appeals process 
allows a rejected applicant to continue fishing pending the 
outcome of the appeal to prevent any prejudicial delay.  As 
the District Court aptly observed, Amendment 11 does not 
preclude the use of data the fishermen consider superior B 
rather, it allows for its full consideration at an adversarial 
hearing. 
Issue 4: National Standard 5 
The fishermen=s final objection is to the District 
Court=s finding that the Secretary took sufficient account of 
non-economic objectives in implementing Amendment 11.  
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National Standard 5 requires that A[c]onservation and 
management measures shall, where practicable, consider 
efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that 
no such measure shall have economic allocation as its sole 
purpose.@  16 U.S.C. ' 1851(a)(5).  The fishermen argue 
that AAmendment 11 is only an economic re-allocation of 
the scallop resource among competing stakeholders.@  To 
prevail on this claim, the fishermen are required to show 
that the Secretary failed to consider any non-economic 
objectives in promulgating Amendment 11.  See Alaska 
Factory Trawler Ass=n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d 1456, 1460 
(9th Cir. 1987).   
That Amendment 11 had economic consequences is 
undeniable.  That it took into account Abiological, 
ecological, and social objectives@ as well is readily apparent 
from the record.  See 50 C.F.R. ' 600.330(e).  As NMFS 
explained, the motivating force in the development of 
Amendment 11 was the control of mortality in the general 
category fishery and that economic considerations were 
secondary.  AAmendment 11 recognizes that, without 
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controls on the number of participants, the general category 
fleet can expand, especially when the resource conditions 
are very good[,] . . . [which] could contribute to overfishing 
if combined with the full utilization of limited access 
effort.@  73 Fed. Reg. at 20098.21  There is ample evidence 
in the record to support the District Court=s determination 
that National Standard 5 was met. 
                                                 
21
 Amendment 11=s Final Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement spells out that A[e]conomic 
allocation is not the sole purpose of this action: the 
measures are primarily intended to control mortality in the 
general category fishing and do so in the most equitable and 
efficient way possible while maintaining the historical 
character of the fishery.@  
IV.         
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
 
